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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 09-3167 
__________ 
 
VIRGIN ISLANDS WATER AND POWER AUTHORITY 
 
v. 
 
GENERAL ELECTRIC INTERNATIONAL INC.,  
 
       Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the District of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. No. 3-06-cv-00131) 
District Judge:  Honorable Curtis V. Gomez 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 December 12, 2013 
 
BEFORE:  FISHER, SHWARTZ, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed:  March 19, 2014) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 In 2006, the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority (WAPA) sued Appellant 
General Electric (GE) for an alleged breach of contract.  The contract in question 
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involved the inspection and repair of industrial power production equipment.  The parties 
engaged in discovery and mediation.  However, in May of 2008, GE moved to compel 
arbitration and to stay the proceedings during that process. 
 The Magistrate Judge denied GE’s motion, finding it “mooted by the agreement of 
the parties to engage in production and to mediate . . .  .”  Approximately ten months 
later, GE asked the District Court Judge for a hearing on its motion to compel arbitration 
and to stay the proceedings.  The District Court denied GE’s motion to compel.  First, the 
Court noted that the Magistrate Judge was not authorized to rule on GE’s motion to 
compel because such decisions are not within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Federal 
Magistrates Act.  Then, after engaging in de novo review of the contract and other 
relevant documents, the District Court held that the contract did not contain an arbitration 
agreement.  GE has appealed that decision.  WAPA, however, maintains that GE’s failure 
to follow the procedures for challenging a Magistrate Judge’s decision, as set out in the 
Federal Rules, deprived the District Court, and this Court by extension, of jurisdiction.   
II. 
 The Federal Arbitration Act gives us jurisdiction to review a district court’s denial 
of a motion to compel arbitration.  9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B).  WAPA argues that we lack 
jurisdiction because GE failed to object to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling that its motion to 
compel arbitration was mooted by GE’s agreement to proceed with discovery and 
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mediation.  Indeed, the record reflects no objection filed by GE within the 10-day time 
period allotted by the Federal Rules.  See FED.R.CIV.P.  72(a).
1
 
 GE maintains that the Magistrate Judge’s mootness determination merely deferred 
or postponed a ruling on its motion to compel arbitration.  The District Court agreed,
2
 
despite its own acknowledgement that the motion had been “administratively 
terminated.”  Not only did the District Court believe GE’s motion to compel remained 
pending, it also held that the Magistrate Judge lacked the authority to rule on such matters 
in the first place.  The District Court gave no reasoning for this determination beyond the 
fact that 28 U.S.C. § 636 does not list “motions to compel arbitration” among the type of 
motions a magistrate judge is authorized to rule on.  
 The Local Rules of the District Court for the Virgin Islands refer all pretrial 
motions in civil cases to federal Magistrate Judges, so long as permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 
636.  See LRCi 72.1.  That statute provides that a magistrate judge may hear and 
determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, with the following exceptions:  1) 
a motion for injunctive relief; 2) a motion for a judgment on the pleadings; 3) a motion 
for summary judgment; 4) a motion to dismiss or quash an indictment or information; 5) 
a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal case; 6) a motion to dismiss or permit 
                                              
1
 Rule 72(a) was amended in 2009 to provide a 14-day period to object to a Magistrate 
Judge’s Report and Recommendation. 
 
2Judge Shwartz would agree that the Magistrate Judge’s Order finding the motion was 
moot was a case management order and not a ruling on the merits of the motion to 
compel arbitration.  As a result, she would find it unnecessary to address whether the 
Magistrate Judge had the authority to rule on the merits of such a motion.  Nonetheless, 
Judge Shwartz joins in Part III of this Opinion and agrees that the District Court should 
be affirmed.  
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maintenance of a class action; 7) a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; and 8) a 
motion to involuntarily dismiss an action.  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).  This list of 
dispositive motions is not an exhaustive one, but instead merely “informs the 
classification of other motions as dispositive or nondispositive.”  PowerShare, Inc., v. 
Syntel, Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 13 (1
st
 Cir 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are consistent with these classifications.  
Rule 72 sets out procedures and standards of review for district courts to follow when 
reviewing dispositive and nondispositive rulings made by Magistrate Judges. 
 As noted previously, the District Court concluded that Section 636(b)(1)(A) does 
not authorize a Magistrate Judge to rule on a motion to compel arbitration.  It offered no 
reasoning for this conclusion beyond noting that § 636 did not mention such motions.  
The fact that the statute does not specifically mention motions to compel arbitration is 
irrelevant, however.  The appropriate inquiry is whether such a motion is dispositive and 
motions to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings are not.  Such motions, to begin 
with, are not among those listed in § 636(b)(1)(A) and are therefore not specifically 
excluded.  Nor, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has noted, are they the same 
type of motion as those delineated in the statute.  Powershare, 597 F.3d at 14.  We agree 
with the First Circuit.  A ruling on a motion to compel arbitration does not dispose of the 
case, or any claim or defense found therein.  Instead, orders granting this type of motion 
merely suspend the litigation while orders denying it continue the underlying litigation.  
See id.  And, even where motions to compel arbitration are granted, federal courts 
continue to retain the authority to dissolve any stay or make any orders effectuating 
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arbitration awards.  See id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 9 (permitting parties to apply to the court 
for an order confirming an arbitration award); id. at § 10 (providing the district courts 
with authority to vacate an arbitration award); id. at § 11 (providing district courts with 
authority to modify an arbitration award)).  Given this, we see no exercise of Article III 
power when a Magistrate Judge rules on a motion to compel arbitration.  Therefore, the 
District Court incorrectly concluded that Magistrate Judges lack the authority to rule on 
such requests. 
 Given that the motion to compel arbitration was properly before the Magistrate 
Judge, GE was obligated to seek review of that order in the District Court within fourteen 
days of its issuance.  See Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2011); 
United Steelworkers of Amer. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., Inc., 828 F.3d 1001, 1007-08 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (“[P]arties who wish to preserve their objections to a magistrate[] [judge’s] 
order entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) must file their objections in the 
district court.”).  GE did not seek review of the Magistrate Judge’s mootness order.3  See 
FED.R.CIV.P. 72(a); LRCi 72.1.  This failure deprived the District Court of the 
opportunity to remedy any error on the question of mootness.  However, while GE’s 
failure to seek review is not a jurisdictional defect, see United States v. Polishan, 336 
F.3d 234, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), a waiver rule does apply.  See 
                                              
3
GE argued and the District Court apparently agreed that the Magistrate Judge’s order 
finding the motion to compel arbitration moot had no effect.  We disagree.  A ruling on 
mootness, while not dispositive, is a determination nonetheless.  By finding the motion 
moot, the Magistrate Judge, in effect, denied it.   
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Steelworkers, 828 F.2d at 1007-08.  Accordingly, GE’s challenge to the propriety of the 
Magistrate Judge’s order is waived because GE failed to object and we will not review it.   
III. 
 Even were we not to find waiver here, we are satisfied that the contract in question 
lacks a valid agreement to arbitrate and, on that point, the District Court did not err.
4
  
Arbitration “is a matter of consent, not coercion.”  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).  “[A] party may not be 
compelled under the [Federal Arbitration Act] to submit to . . . arbitration unless there is 
a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”  Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (discussing class arbitration).  To 
determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, we employ state principles of 
contract law.  See Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 584 
F.3d 513, 532 (3d Cir. 2009).
5
   
 Because the actual contract between the parties does not contain an arbitration 
agreement, GE calls our attention to a document referenced in that contract entitled 
                                              
4
 Our review of the District Court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration is 
plenary.  Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citations omitted).  That means we apply the same standard as the District Court, and we 
will compel arbitration only where there is “no genuine issue of fact concerning the 
formation of the agreement” to arbitrate.  Id. (citing Par–Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge 
Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir.1980)).   
 
5Virgin Islands law upholds contracts where there is “mutual assent” between the parties.  
See Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations 
omitted).    
 
7 
 
“General Terms and Conditions,” as the location for such an agreement.  The section GE 
relies on is entitled “Dispute Resolution” and provides: 
The Arbitration will be conducted by three (3) arbitrators in 
accordance with the American Arbitration Rules in effect at 
the time of the controversy.  Each side will appoint one 
arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so appointed will appoint 
the third arbitrator.  The arbitrators shall render any decision 
or award based solely on “baseball” or “winner-take-all” type 
of arbitration and they will only have the authority to select 
either the amount or remedy proposed by Buyer or by Seller, 
and none other.  The decision of the arbitrators shall be final 
and binding upon both parties, and neither party shall seek 
recourse to a law court or other authorities to appeal for 
revisions of such decision.  The reasonable costs of 
arbitration as well as reasonable legal fees and expenses of 
any dispute conducted pursuant to this Article, shall be borne 
solely by the loser at arbitration. 
 
As the District Court correctly noted, there simply is no express or implied clause in this 
passage evincing the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.  Further, there is no language from 
which we could ascertain what type of disputes the parties are subjecting to arbitration.  
Instead, this clause merely relates procedures for selecting arbitrators, and sets out how 
those arbitrators will make their decisions and which party will pay the costs of any such 
proceedings.   
IV. 
 In sum, by failing to appeal the decision of the Magistrate Judge, GE waived any 
challenge to the propriety of his order.  And, even were we to excuse such a waiver, the 
contract in question does not contain an agreement to arbitrate and, therefore, we see no 
error in the District Court’s decision to deny GE’s motion to compel arbitration. 
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
